Modeling Migration-Induced Unemployment

This paper explains why a wave of in-migration reduces the employment rate of local workers, and why this reduction is larger in bad times. Yet, when the labor market is inefficiently tight, in-migration improves local welfare because it aids firms in recruiting.

December 2024 · Pascal Michaillat

u* = √uv: The Full-Employment Rate of Unemployment in the United States

This paper finds that in the United States the full-employment rate of unemployment (FERU) is the geometric average of the unemployment and vacancy rates. Between 1930 and 2024, the FERU averages 4.1% and is very stable.

September 2024 · Pascal Michaillat, Emmanuel Saez

Beveridgean Unemployment Gap

This paper develops a sufficient-statistic formula for the unemployment gap. The formula depends on the elasticity of the Beveridge curve, cost of unemployment, and recruiting cost. In the United States the unemployment gap is countercyclical and often positive.

December 2021 · Pascal Michaillat, Emmanuel Saez

A Macroeconomic Approach to Optimal Unemployment Insurance: Theory

This paper develops a theory of optimal unemployment insurance in matching models. It derives a sufficient-statistic formula for optimal unemployment insurance, which is useful to determine the optimal cyclicality of unemployment insurance.

May 2018 · Camille Landais, Pascal Michaillat, Emmanuel Saez

Do Matching Frictions Explain Unemployment? Not in Bad Times

This paper proposes a matching model of the labor market with job rationing: unemployment does not disappear in the absence of matching frictions. In recessions, job rationing drives the rise of unemployment, whereas matching frictions contribute little to it.

June 2012 · Pascal Michaillat