This paper detects US recessions early from unemployment and vacancy data, using pseudo-out-of-sample tests to choose the appropriate recession classifier. Out of sample, it issues early warnings on average 5.2 months before the NBER, with only one false positive between 1978 and 2025.

This paper constructs a Phillips curve from the Beveridge curve. The Phillips curve arises because prices respond to slack. It satisfies the divine coincidence: prices are stable at full employment. And it describes inflation as a decreasing and convex function of unemployment.

This paper explains why a wave of in-migration increases the unemployment rate of local workers, and why this increase is larger in bad times. Yet, when the labor market is inefficiently tight, in-migration improves local welfare because it aids firms in recruiting.

This paper builds a model of hypothesis testing with p-hacking and gives critical values that correct the inflated type 1 error rate caused by p-hacking. As a rule of thumb, such robust critical values are classical critical values with one fifth of the significance level.

This paper develops the Michez rule, a fast and robust method to detect US recessions using data on unemployment and job vacancies. In December 2024, the rule gives a recession probability of 27%; this recession risk was first detected in March 2024.

This paper finds that in the United States the full-employment rate of unemployment (FERU) is the geometric average of the unemployment and vacancy rates. Between 1930 and 2024, the FERU averages 4.1% and is very stable.

This paper develops a policy-oriented business-cycle model with fluctuating unemployment and long zero-lower-bound episodes. The innovations are that producers and consumers meet through a matching function, and wealth enters the utility function.

This paper develops a sufficient-statistic formula for the unemployment gap. The formula depends on the elasticity of the Beveridge curve, cost of unemployment, and recruiting cost. In the United States the unemployment gap is countercyclical and often positive.

This paper develops a model of pricing in which buyers care about the fairness of markups but misinfer them from prices. The model yields price rigidity, generates realistic Phillips curves, and explains why people dislike inflation so much.

This paper resolves the anomalies of the New Keynesian model at the zero lower bound—explosive recessions, forward-guidance puzzle, fiscal-multiplier puzzle—by introducing wealth into the utility function.

This paper shows that when unemployment is inefficient, optimal public expenditure deviates from the Samuelson rule to reduce the unemployment gap. Optimal stimulus spending depends on the unemployment gap, unemployment multiplier, and an elasticity of substitution.

This paper develops a model of science. It shows that due to homophily in tenure decisions, false paradigms may persist when a science has low power. Low power may come from a lack of evidence, or from a reluctance to base tenure decisions on available evidence.

This paper explores how the optimal generosity of unemployment insurance varies over the business cycle in the United States. It finds that the optimal replacement rate is countercyclical, just like the actual replacement rate.

This paper develops a theory of optimal unemployment insurance in matching models. It derives a sufficient-statistic formula for optimal unemployment insurance, which is useful to determine the optimal cyclicality of unemployment insurance.

This paper develops a model of unemployment fluctuations. The innovation is to represent the labor and product markets with a matching structure. The model simultaneously features Keynesian unemployment, classical unemployment, and frictional unemployment.

This paper develops a New Keynesian model in which the government multiplier doubles when the unemployment rate rises from 5% to 8%. The multiplier is so countercyclical because in bad times, on the labor market, job rationing dwarfs matching frictions.

This paper proposes a matching model of the labor market with job rationing: unemployment does not disappear in the absence of matching frictions. In recessions, job rationing drives the rise of unemployment, whereas matching frictions contribute little to it.