BEVERIDGEAN UNEMPLOYMENT GAP

Pascal Michaillat, Emmanuel Saez

Paper available at https://pascalmichaillat.org/9/

DOES THE LABOR MARKET OPERATE EFFICIENTLY?

- we develop welfare-based measure of unemployment gap
    - = actual unemployment rate – efficient unemployment rate
- ⤳ model design
    - – bargained wages or competitive search?
   - – rigid wages?
- ⤳ distance from "full employment"
- ⤳ optimal macro policies
    - – monetary policy
   - – fiscal policy
    - – unemployment insurance

THEORY

US BEVERIDGE CURVE

US BEVERIDGE CURVE

CONDITION FOR LABOR-MARKET EFFICIENCY

# CONDITION FOR LABOR-MARKET EFFICIENCY

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Beveridge curve

Efficiency

Isowelfare curve

Vacancy rate

Unemployment rate

UNEMPLOYMENT GAP

Beveridge curve

Gap > 0

Isowelfare curve

Vacancy rate

Unemployment rate

UNEMPLOYMENT GAP

BEVERIDGEAN MODEL OF LABOR MARKET

1. Beveridge curve: $v(u)$

   - v: vacancy rate
   - u: unemployment rate
   - $v(u)$: decreasing in u, convex

2. social welfare: $\widehat{\mathcal{W}}(u, v) = \mathcal{W}(n, u, v)$ with $n = 1 - u$

   - n: employment rate
   - $\mathcal{W}$: production + recruiting + preferences
   - $\widehat{\mathcal{W}}(u, v)$: decreasing in u and v, quasiconcave

GRAPHICAL CONDITION FOR EFFICIENCY

- efficiency at tangency point: $v'(u) = MRS_{uv}$

- decomposing the social marginal rate of substitution:

$$MRS_{uv} = -\frac{\partial \widehat{W}/\partial u}{\partial \widehat{W}/\partial v}$$

- social value of nonwork: $\zeta = (\partial W/\partial u)/(\partial W/\partial n) < 1$

- recruiting cost: $\kappa = -(\partial W/\partial v)/(\partial W/\partial n) > 0$

- efficiency condition:

$$v'(u) = -\frac{1-\zeta}{\kappa}$$

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SUFFICIENT-STATISTIC FORMULA FOR EFFICIENCY

- labor market tightness: $\theta = v/u$

- Beveridge elasticity: $\epsilon = -d\ln(v)/d\ln(u) > 0$

- efficient labor market tightness:

$$v'(u) = -\frac{1 - \zeta}{\kappa}$$

- u^* obtained from θ^* through Beveridge curve

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$$\frac{u^*}{u} = \left(\frac{\theta^*}{\theta}\right)^{-1/(1+\epsilon)}$$

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- u^* obtained from θ^* through Beveridge curve

$$u^* = \left(\frac{\kappa \cdot \epsilon}{1 - \zeta} \cdot \frac{v}{u^{-\epsilon}} \right)^{1/(1+\epsilon)}$$

APPLICATION TO THE UNITED STATES

UNEMPLOYMENT RATE (CPS)

VACANCY RATE (BARNICHON 2010 & JOLTS)

BEVERIDGE-CURVE BRANCHES (BAI, PERRON 1998)

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2019

2009

Log vacancy rate

Log unemployment rate

BEVERIDGE ELASTICITY (BAI, PERRON 1998)

SOCIAL VALUE OF NONWORK

- Borgschulte, Martorell (2018): natural experiment using military administrative data
  - 420,000 veterans
  - home production + recreation = 13%–35% earnings
- Mas, Pallais (2019): field experiment in which job applicants choose wage-hour bundles
  - 900 subjects
  - home production + recreation = 58% earnings

⤳ $\zeta \in [0.03, 0.49]$, with median value of $\zeta = 0.26$

RECRUITING COST

- 1997 National Employer Survey, administered by Census Bureau
  - 2,000 establishments
  - establishments have $\geq$ 20 workers
  - establishments belong to all industries
- recruiting = 3.2% of labor costs

⤳ κ = 0.92

EFFICIENT TIGHTNESS & TIGHTNESS GAP

EFFICIENT UNEMPLOYMENT & UNEMPLOYMENT GAP

COMPARISON WITH EXISTING "NATURAL RATES"

ALTERNATIVE CALIBRATIONS OF STATISTICS

BEVERIDGE ELASTICITY IN 95% CI

INVERSE-OPTIMUM ϵ, SO $u = u^*$

PLAUSIBLE SOCIAL VALUES OF NONWORK

INVERSE-OPTIMUM ζ, SO $u = u^*$

PLAUSIBLE RECRUITING COSTS

INVERSE-OPTIMUM κ, SO $u = u^*$

# HAGEDORN, MANOVSKII (2008): $\zeta = 0.96$

APPLICATION TO

DIAMOND-MORTENSEN-PISSARIDES MODEL

UNEMPLOYMENT: ON DMP BEVERIDGE CURVE

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SUFFICIENT STATISTICS IN DMP MODEL

- Beveridge curve: UE flows = EU flows

$$v(u) = \left[\frac{\lambda \cdot (1 - u)}{\omega \cdot u^{\eta}} \right]^{1/(1-\eta)}$$

⤳ Beveridge elasticity:

$$\epsilon = \frac{1}{1 - \eta} \left[\eta + \frac{u}{1 - u} \right]$$

- social welfare: $\mathcal{W}(n, u, v) = p \cdot (n + z \cdot u - c \cdot v)$

⤳ social value of nonwork: $\zeta = z$

⤳ recruiting cost: $\kappa = c$

DMP BUSINESS CYCLES IN BEVERIDGE DIAGRAM

DMP BUSINESS CYCLES IN BEVERIDGE DIAGRAM

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BEVERIDGEAN EFFICIENCY ≈ HOSIOSIAN EFFICIENCY

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CONCLUSION

SUMMARY

- socially efficient unemployment rate u^* & unemployment gap $u - u^*$ are determined by 3 sufficient statistics
    - elasticity of Beveridge curve
    - social cost of unemployment
    - cost of recruiting
- in the United States, 1951–2019:
    - u^* averages 4.3% $\rightsquigarrow$ $u - u^*$ averages 1.4pp
    - 3.0% < u^* < 5.4% $\rightsquigarrow$ $u - u^*$ is countercyclical
  $\rightsquigarrow$ labor market is inefficient
  $\rightsquigarrow$ labor market is inefficiently slack in slumps

IMPLICATIONS FOR MODEL DESIGN

- models featuring an efficient labor market are inconsistent with our findings

  – DMP model with Hosios (1990) condition

  – models with competitive-search equilibrium (Moen 1997)

- models producing a countercyclical unemployment gap are consistent with our findings

  – DMP model with bargaining-power shocks (Shimer 2005)

  – variant of the DMP model with rigid wages (Hall 2005)

IMPLICATIONS FOR POLICY DESIGN

- optimal nominal interest rate is procyclical
  - optimal for monetary policy to eliminate the unemployment gap (Michaillat, Saez 2021)
  - unemployment ↑ when interest rate ↑ (Coibion 2012)
- optimal government spending is countercyclical
  - optimal for government spending to reduce—but not eliminate—the unemployment gap (Michaillat, Saez 2019)
  - unemployment ↓ when spending ↑ (Ramey 2013)

IMPLICATIONS FOR POLICY DESIGN

- optimal unemployment insurance is countercyclical
    - US tightness gap is procyclical
    - optimal for unemployment insurance to reduce the tightness gap (Landais, Michaillat, Saez 2018)
    - tightness ↑ when unemployment insurance ↑ (Landais, Michaillat, Saez 2018)